DEBATE

THE FUTURE OF THE UNITED STATES
COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS

In The Future of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Professors Lisa
Crooms and Dawinder Sidhu discuss the potential for expanding the
mandate of the Commission. Professor Crooms opens by noting that
suggestions to expand the Commission’s mandate to include human
rights have been around for decades, and argues that such ideas are
still worth adopting. She comments that the Commission would have
to engage in extensive fact-finding in order to justify such an
expansion.
Professor Crooms raises further concerns over
manipulation of the appointment process for commissioners, but that
such manipulation has not necessarily jeopardized the Commission’s
role. Indeed, she concludes that an expansion of the mandate to
include human rights would aid the United States in meeting its treaty
obligations and discourage the Commission from ignoring its vital
role in responding to important equality issues, including those
already within its core mandate.
Professor Sidhu argues that the Commission's current civil rights
mandate is too valuable to be expanded because persistent and
complex traditional civil rights issues require its determined focus.
Ultimately, he writes, the question is how to make the Commission
more effective in meeting its existing obligations. Rather than
expanding its mandate to include broad human rights oversight, which
would dilute the Commission's existing duties, Sidhu contends that the
Commission and civil rights compliance more generally would stand to
benefit from a reinterpretation of its civil rights mandate, which may
generate renewed public and government support for the Commission's
work. Sidhu concludes that human rights monitoring may be best
assumed by a separate federal independent agency.

(127)

128

University of Pennsylvania Law Review
PENNumbra

[Vol. 159: 127

OPENING STATEMENT
Seeing Through a Glass Darkly No More ∗: Making the Case
for a U.S. Commission on Human Rights
Lisa Crooms

†

The United States Commission on Civil Rights has been criticized
with little regard for political fealty. It may indeed be the proverbial
needle in the haystack of partisan politics. The universality of the
belief that the Commission is broken, however, belies the widely
divergent views about how it got that way and what to do about it.
Some contend “the Commission has outlived its usefulness” because
the discrimination and inequality at the center of its mandate are
history. Ben Smith, A Conservative Dismisses Right-Wing Black Panther
“Fantasies,” POLITICO, July 16, 2010, http://dyn.politico.com/
printstory.cfm?uuid=DD3055BF-18FE-70B2-A836F25EC61EF57A (quoting
Linda Chavez, president of the Center for Equal Opportunity).
Others claim the Commission is hampered by a double standard that
not only fails to take black racism seriously, but also supports the kinds
of preferential programs and policies the Supreme Court rejects.
Letter from Gerald A. Reynolds, Chairman, U.S. Comm’n on Civil
Rights, to Eric Holder, U.S. Attorney Gen. (Oct. 16, 2010), available at
http://www.usccr.gov/NBPH/10-13-10_Ltr2Holder-Perez.pdf.
Still
others believe partisan maneuvering has stacked the Commission with
ideologues hostile to the agency’s equality and nondiscrimination
mandate, seriously compromising the Commission’s ability to do its
work. GARRINE P. LANEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34699 THE U.S.
COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS: HISTORY, FUNDING AND CURRENT
ISSUES 17-20 (2008).
There is a certain amount of truth in all three views. The circa
1957 racism at which the Commission first took aim has changed.
Created only three years after Brown v. Board of Education, the
Commission fixed its crosshairs on Jim Crow and de jure racial
segregation. In 2010, de facto racial discrimination persists, rendered
∗
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all but unreachable by the outdated notions of intent associated with
its de jure counterpart. Without demonstrable intent, discrimination
is beyond the law, set there by Supreme Court decisions based on false
notions of racial equality. These are the cases that offer views of
equality and nondiscrimination untethered from the racially specific
history of the amendments on which much of modern civil rights law
is based. This world is color-blind. Here, racism and racial
discrimination are equal opportunity offenses. In the context of the
Commission, this is exacerbated by those who are willing to play fast
and loose with the rules governing the appointment of commissioners
and the Commission’s composition. The Commission has come to be
dominated by a conservative majority in which Republicans and
Independents are virtually indistinguishable.
While some might conclude that the best way to fix the
Commission is to kill it, I disagree.
Rather, expanding the
Commission’s mandate could go a long way towards refocusing its
efforts on the independent monitoring of the government’s civil
rights record that marked the highpoint of the Commission’s history.
Adding ratified human rights treaties to the body of law with which
the Commission is concerned will better enable the United States to
meet its treaty obligations. In this situation, more rather than less
might be warranted.
Expanding the Commission’s focus to reach human rights was
first proposed in the early 1970s by Notre Dame University President
and charter member of the Commission, Father Theodore M.
Hesburgh. Theodore M. Hesburgh, The Commission on Civil Rights—
And Human Rights, 34 REV. OF POL. 291, 303-04 (1972). Since then,
Father Hesburgh’s idea has been reprised by others both within and
outside the Commission. MARY FRANCES BERRY, AND JUSTICE FOR ALL
175, 338 (2009). Recently, the call to expand the Commission’s
mandate in this way has been taken up by social justice, civil rights,
and human rights organizations that believe this shift would restore
luster to the Commission’s reputation as “the conscience of the
nation.” The Law of the Land: U.S. Implementation of Human Rights
Treaties: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Human Rights & the Law and the
S. Judiciary Comm., 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Wade
Henderson, President & CEO, The Leadership Conference on Civil
and Human Rights); see also Lisa A. Crooms, Bringing Human Rights
Home to Help People Who Need Help the Most, ROLL CALL, Dec. 11, 2009,
http://www.rollcall.com/news/41435-1.html;
Catherine
Powell,
Human Rights at Home: A Domestic Policy Blueprint for the New
Administration AMERICAN CONSTITUTION SOCIETY, 4-5 (Oct. 30 2008),
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http://www.acslaw.org/files/C%20Powell%20Blueprint.pdf.
To be sure, the vision of human rights on which this proposed
expansion is based would probably resolve the Commission’s current
ideological disputes in favor of those who believe that “[a]t the heart
of the civil rights movements is the basic human dignity of all people and
their right to live in freedom with justice and equal opportunity.”
LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE ON CIVIL RIGHTS EDUCATION FUND, RESTORING
THE CONSCIENCE OF A NATION: A REPORT ON THE U.S. COMMISSION ON
CIVIL RIGHTS 44 (2009), http://www.civilrights.org/publications/
reports/commission/lccref_commission_report_march2009.pdf. At a
minimum, however, this expansion would require the Commission to
engage in the kind of fact-finding on which its early reputation was
built and which was essential to making the case for laws such as the
Civil Rights Act of 1965, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and the Fair
Housing Act of 1968. It would shift the Commission’s focus from false
issues such as the investigation of voterless claims of voter intimidation
in the interest of taking black racism seriously. Adam Serwer, Do We Need
a Commission on Civil Rights?, AMERICAN PROSPECT, July 21, 2010,
http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=do_we_need_a_commissi
on_on_civil_rights. It could decrease the ability of the Commission to
absent itself from serious human rights events such as Hurricane
Katrina and its aftermath, police murders in cities such as Oakland,
California, and the racially motivated abuse of the criminal justice system
in Jena, Louisiana. Id. These are among the things that could change by
expanding the Commission’s mandate to include human rights.
This is not meant to suggest there would be no room for debate
among the Commissioners. Diversity of opinion is necessary for the
kind of robust discourse that allowed the Commission to play an
important role in the civil rights revolution of the 1960s and 1970s.
Even in those halcyon days, the Commission’s independence was
threatened by those on whom the Commission cast an unflattering
light. Despite these tensions, politics did not seriously deter the
Commission from performing its essential functions and gathering the
empirical data that demonstrated the need for major civil rights
legislation. In 1983, this changed when the appointment rules were
altered. New rules meant Commissioners were no longer chosen by
the President with the bipartisanship that receiving advice and
consent from the Senate requires. Interbranch responsibility would
be shared in a different way, with four Commissioners appointed by
the President, and two each by the President Pro Tempore of the
Senate and the Speaker of the House.
These congressional
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appointments need only be informed by recommendations from the
leaders of the majority and minority parties. Laney, supra, at 6-7, 17-18.
They do not require any real bipartisanship.
The danger posed by these rules is the politically motivated
manipulation of the appointments process they have been interpreted
to permit. Over the past ten years, Republicans have been able to
avoid the “no more than four” rule by appointing Independents
rather than Democrats.
These Commissioners appear to be
Independent in name only and, more often than not, take positions
that make them indistinguishable from their Republican
counterparts. Perhaps the most egregious example of this type of
political maneuvering involves Vice-Chairperson Abigail Thernstrom,
who has, since 2001, changed her political affiliation twice. With each
change, Thernstrom created an opening filled by a conservative with
the needed party affiliation to avoid running afoul of the appointment
rules. With the exception of Thernstrom herself, most of the
Commissioners appointed in this way lack any appreciable civil rights
expertise beyond opposing affirmative action.
Serwer, supra.
Satisfying the letter of the appointments rules at the expense of their
spirit has prevented the Commission from constructively contributing
to civil rights discourse and has compromised its efforts to monitor
government implementation and enforcement of civil rights laws.
The likelihood that adding human rights to the Commission’s
mandate could help to overcome these difficulties increases if the
Commission is constituted in accord with the Paris Principles. United
Nations General Assembly Resolution 48/134 sets forth “[p]rinciples
relating to the status of national [human rights] institutions,”
according to which Commission membership and composition would
be determined by “a procedure which affords all necessary guarantees
to ensure the pluralist representation of the social forces (of civilian
society) involved in the protection and promotion of human rights,
particularly by powers which will enable effective cooperation.” Paris
Principles, G.A. Res. 48/134, at 4-5, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/134 (Mar.
4, 1994). This standard is at odds with the manipulation of the
appointments rules that has facilitated the current conservative
majority—for which any distinction between Republicans and
Independents is largely one of name rather than substance.
Transforming the Commission into a national human rights
institution can also help the United States meet its obligations under
the human rights treaties it has ratified. Beginning in the 1990s, no
fewer than three United Nations’ human rights treaty bodies have
expressed concern about the absence of a national, independent
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human rights institution. Previous administrations chose either to
ignore these concerns or deflect them with broad pronouncements
about the limits of federalism and the primacy of the states. Most
recently, however, the call for an independent human rights
institution was met with assurances from the Obama Administration
that creating such an institution was “currently under consideration in
the United States.” Human Rights Council, Draft Report of the Working
Group on the Universal Periodic Review: United States of America, ¶ 29, U.N.
Doc. A/HRC/WG.6/9/L.9 (Nov. 10, 2010). There are a number of
different forms that national, independent human rights institutions
can take, including the form that would be created by transforming
the Commission into such an institution. While the ultimate outcome
of this consideration is unknown, what is fairly certain is that other
assurances to ratify signed treaties—such as the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women—will make the need for a national human rights institution
more urgent. The Administration’s commitment to leading by
example in matters of human rights makes the need for such an
institution more, rather than less, pressing.
Finally, expanding the Commission’s mandate to include human
rights would permit it to fill a gap in the agency’s jurisdiction, thereby
strengthening its work. The Paris Principles require that national
human rights institutions “be given as broad a mandate as possible,
which shall be clearly set forth in a constitutional or legislative text,
specifying its composition and its sphere of competence.” Paris
Principles, supra, at 4. Addressing discrimination based on statuses
such as sexual orientation, gender identity, and poverty “could make
clear a concern with the nexus between race, sex, disability, age,
national origin, sexual orientation, religious discrimination, poverty,
and civil liberties concerns.” BERRY, supra, at 338. This is the type of
broad mandate that the Paris Principles require. It involves the kind
of expansion with which the Commission is familiar, having added
discrimination on the basis of age, sex, and disability to its original
four areas of concern: race, color, religion, and national origin. The
Commission’s own history attests to its ability to address more without
losing sight of its core issues and concerns.
Recent events
demonstrate that the unfinished business of racial justice and equality
has not been lost in the larger universe of interdependent human
rights. Concerns about the effect of race and racial discrimination on
basic human rights remain central to any comprehensive evaluation of
the United States’s human rights record. As long as civil rights are
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understood as part of the broader human rights framework, there is
nothing to indicate that broadening the Commission’s mandate will
yield a human rights agenda in which the continuing need to remedy
racial discrimination will be either eclipsed or forgotten.
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REBUTTAL
On Reframing, Not Expanding, the Commission’s Mandate
Dawinder S. Sidhu

†

The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights is an independent federal
agency responsible for (1) investigating deprivations of the right to
vote resulting from discrimination or fraud; (2) examining and
apprising laws related to discrimination or the denial of equal
protection of the laws under the Constitution; and (3) submitting
reports to the President and Congress on its fact-finding efforts. See 42
U.S.C. § 1975a (a), (c) (2006); Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 440
(1960). For the reasons that follow, I argue that the mandate of the
Commission should not be expanded beyond these traditional civil
rights obligations to include monitoring of the nation’s compliance
with international human rights laws. In the Conclusion, I offer
several modest suggestions for how the Commission can enhance its
institutional credibility, better meet its existing duties, and be more
worthy of the public’s sacred trust.
I. COMMON GROUND
To begin, it may be helpful to identify several fundamental points
on which Professor Crooms and I agree. First, we agree that a federal
entity independent of the tripartite branches of the federal
government should study and assess whether the United States
upholds its commitments to voluntarily assumed international human
rights laws. The extent to which the United States adheres to human
rights laws demonstrates that it is truly faithful to the rule of law and
indicates to the broader global community, including moderate and
fringe elements in the Muslim world, that America upholds certain
essential values in practice—not just in abstract belief. See JOSEPH NYE,
JR., SOFT POWER 55 (2004).
Second, Professor Crooms and I both recognize that the
Commission has faced significant criticism for failing to adequately
fulfill its mandate, with some commentators calling for its closure. See,
e.g., LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE ON CIVIL RIGHTS EDUCATION FUND,
†
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supra, at 4 (“Today, the [C]ommission is so debilitated as to be
considered moribund.”). I share Professor Crooms’s belief, however,
that the Commission’s doors should not be shut. The factual
predicate for the Commission’s existence—systemic and entrenched
civil rights issues, including race discrimination in voting—continues
to persist and requires serious analysis. In the 2009 decision Bartlett v.
Strickland, the Court recognized as much, noting that
some commentators suggest that racially polarized voting is waning—as
evidenced by, for example, the election of minority candidates where a
majority of voters are white. Still, racial discrimination and racially
polarized voting are not ancient history. Much remains to be done to
ensure that citizens of all races have equal opportunity to share and
participate in our democratic processes and traditions.

129 S. Ct. 1231, 1249 (2009).
Thus totally abolishing the
Commission—thereby leaving Americans without an independent
arbiter of the government’s civil rights record—is neither sensible nor
in the best interests of the nation.
Third, Professor Crooms and I agree that a diversity of
backgrounds, viewpoints, and perspectives on the Commission is
necessary for a robust and meaningful evaluation of civil rights in the
country, both in identifying which problems to address and in
recommending remedial action with respect to these problems. An
absence of diversity limits the credibility of the Commission’s factual
findings and substantive determinations, whereas its existence may
enrich the intellectual quality of and provide greater legitimacy to the
Commission’s work. Fourth, and relatedly, conscious efforts to
subvert or bypass rules and policies designed to ensure diversity on
the Commission only serve to undermine the agency as an institution
and should be strongly discouraged.
II. REFRAMING “CIVIL RIGHTS” AS “HUMAN RIGHTS”
With this foundation of commonalities in mind, we may now turn
to where Professor Crooms and I appear to consider things
differently, despite our other shared beliefs. As Professor Crooms
notes, the idea of adding a human rights agenda to the Commission’s
responsibilities can be traced to an article by Father Theodore M.
Hesburgh. See generally Hesburgh, supra. In the article, Father
Hesburgh expressed his concern that the hard work of public servants
in the civil rights arena had been “canceled out by silence.” Id. at 302.
To ensure that these civil rights efforts gained appropriate attention
from the government and the people, Father Hesburgh suggested that
“civil rights . . . might [better] be faced in terms of human rights.” Id.
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at 303 (quoting Implementation of Recommendations of Presidential and
National Commissions: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Practice
and Procedure of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 92nd Cong. 272 (1971)
[hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Theodore M. Hesburgh, C.S.C.,
Chairman, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights)). This statement reveals
that Father Hesburgh sensed that civil rights matters may attain
greater traction in the halls of power and in the public square if they
are reframed as human rights issues.
Further, Father Hesburgh wrote that the original focus of the
Commission—racial segregation and similar, overt, race-based
discrimination—had been “pretty well cleaned up,” however other
“problems in housing, employment, and schools” and “administration
of justice problems as they pertain to . . . [minority groups]” remained
and needed to be addressed by the Commission. Id. (quoting
Hearings, supra, at 272 (statement of Theodore M. Hesburgh, C.S.C.,
Chairman, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights)). Father Hesburgh
therefore proposed that the Commission shift its efforts away from
traditional race-based discrimination to other facets of discrimination
“such as rights for children or rights for women or rights for old people.”
Id. at 304 (quoting Hearings, supra, at 272 (statement of Theodore M.
Hesburgh, C.S.C., Chairman, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights)).
It seems that the full spectrum of civil rights monitoring and its’
rebranding of them as human rights issues are what Father Hesburgh
had in mind for the Commission in his seminal piece. The force and
prescient nature of these views, as I interpret them, becomes apparent
in consideration of the present, post-9/11 context. Speaking on the
rights of Muslims after 9/11, Professor Baher Azmy observed that
there has not been an “appetite in the courts or frankly in the public
at large for a narrative or discussion about the rights of these
individuals as individuals.” Professor Baher Azmy, Remarks at the
University of Pennsylvania Panel Discussion: Nine Years Later: Civil
Rights and Civil Liberties in Post-9/11 America, (Sept. 28, 2010)
[hereinafter Panel Discussion]. Because of the sentiment that “‘if
you’re one of the bad guys, we really don’t want to hear about your
rights,’” some legal scholars and activists have begun to reframe
Muslim rights as human rights because “human rights belong to
everyone” and thus are more identifiable to public officials and the
people. Professor Kermit Roosevelt, Panel Discussion, supra.
In my view, to reframe civil rights as human rights and to
commensurately reframe the mandate of the Commission to include
“human rights” as defined in this fashion may not only enhance
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government and public interest in and support for the Commission’s
work, but may also adjust public perceptions such that infringements
of anyone’s rights necessarily may be seen to affect the rights of
everyone else. I therefore find quite appealing Father Hesburgh’s
argument for the Commission’s more comprehensive assumption of
discrimination issues and for them to be presented in greater society
as shared human rights’ problems. In this limited sense, I agree that
the Commission can be represented as an investigative body with
human rights functions.
III. ADDING INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
LAWS PROPER TO THE PLATE
Father Hesburgh’s views on the Commission’s mandate did not,
however, stop at reframing civil rights as shared human rights. He
proposed separately that the Commission’s work include civil rights
monitoring as well as efforts to ensure the general well-being of
society—for example by addressing poverty, nutrition, welfare, and
related social issues. See BERRY, supra, at 126-28. The Nixon White
House rejected this idea. Id. at 128. Subsequently, during the Carter
Administration, a Commission staffer asserted that the Commission’s
role should be expanded to liaise with human rights entities in other
countries for the purpose of supplementing President Carter’s
demonstrated interest in international human rights—an idea that
also failed to meet with approval. Id. at 175.
The latest iteration of this proposal has been expressed most
notably by Professor Berry, Former Chair of the Commission. She
writes that “the [C]ommission could be converted into a human rights
commission devoted to the idea that all people have a right to be
treated fairly because of their humanity, as suggested by . . . Father
Theodore Hesburgh . . . .” Id. at 337-38. To the extent this restates
the “reframing” idea described in Section II, I agree with Professor
Berry. She goes on, however, to argue that the Commission “could
also monitor U.S. compliance with the international human rights
covenants to which we are a party and encourage adoption of those we
have not approved.” Id. at 338. Expanding human rights proper to
the Commission’s mandate is imprudent for several reasons:
Advocates of this expansion enumerate several specific issues that
a Commission with added human rights duties would be able to
address. These include racial disparities in the displacement of
individuals in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, the fatal shooting
of an unarmed African American by Oakland police officers, and
allegations of racial injustices in the criminal justice system as
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exemplified by the “Jena 6.” These issues implicate questions of
differential or unjust treatment premised on membership to a
protected class, and thus seem to be well within the Commission’s
existing mandate to examine discrimination and related issues in the
administration of justice. For Professor Berry and others, the problem
therefore appears not to be the scope of the Commission’s
jurisdiction, but how it is exercised or framed for governmental or
public consumption. See The Law of the Land: U.S. Implementation of
Human Rights Treaties: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Human Rights &
the Law and the S. Judiciary Comm., 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of
Wade Henderson, President & CEO, The Leadership Conference on
Civil and Human Rights) (objecting to the fact that the Commission
has opposed landmark hate crimes and employment discrimination
legislation, which also seem to fall squarely within the Commission’s
existing mission).
If it is the case that the Commission has not done an adequate job
of addressing problems it is already charged to investigate, it is
difficult to understand how expanding its mandate can enable, rather
than complicate, its ability to perform its existing functions. The Staff
Director of the Commission from 2004 to 2008, commenting on the
proposal to saddle the Commission with monitoring international
human rights obligations, wrote that advocates of this position need to
explain how “significant additional substantive responsibilities can
have any effect other than to weaken its current capabilities.”
Kenneth L. Marcus, Fixing the Civil Rights Commission, ENGAGE, Mar.
2010, at 12. We would not give an additional child to a babysitter
struggling already to safeguard one toddler on the theory that two will
allow the babysitter to do its job better. Similarly, we would not add
lots of hay to an already mighty haystack in order to help a person
find her needles.
Sifting through that added hay of international human rights laws
is not an insignificant responsibility. It would require the Commission
to look at, for example, allegations of torture by the administration,
whether detainees in Afghanistan are entitled to habeas rights, and
how the detainees in Guantánamo and elsewhere have been treated
by guards, among other things. These are weighty questions that
should not be left with a “debilitated” agency with considerable
functions at present. (They perhaps should go, instead, to a new,
independent federal entity specifically and exclusively established to
monitor America’s compliance with its international human rights
obligations.) Moreover, while civil rights and international human
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rights laws may be linked at the most general level by concerns for
human dignity, both are of a distinct nature, are enforced by
completely different statutes, regulations, and treaties, and implicate
wholly different sets of parties.
Civil rights matters in the United States still require the
comprehensive attention of the Commission because many such issues
requiring serious study exist today and many will arise in the future.
See, e.g., Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231, 1249 (2009). As Professor
Berry herself concedes, “[g]iven the continued contention and
resurgence of conflicts over race and other domestic issues . . . it
might . . . be better to maintain the [C]ommission’s focus on civil
rights in this country.” BERRY, supra, at 338.
Finally, diluting the Commission’s mandate may send the harmful
message that civil rights matters no longer warrant the existence or
focus of a dedicated, independent civil rights agency. Professor Berry
again puts it best: adding a human rights agenda to the Commission’s
mandate “might signal a belief that the work that needs doing is done
or an abandonment of the idea of further progress because the job is
too difficult and the issues intractable.” Id. The very issues that
advocates of a human rights Commission identify in their
arguments—such as racial injustices stemming from Hurricane
Katrina—indicate that civil rights continue to elude our complete
grasp, meaning that our efforts in this regard must press on unabated
and undeterred.
CONCLUSION
None of my arguments against adding human rights monitoring
to the Commission’s responsibilities are meant to deny the value of
and need for human rights compliance efforts. Rather my arguments
are intended only to challenge whether the extent to which American
activities around the world are in lockstep with international human
rights laws is a question that should be presented to a body already
charged with examining the state of equality in the fifty states.
As to improvements to the existing Commission, I believe it would
be better served by an enlarged budget—which would enable it to
adequately engage in its civil rights fact-finding—and reauthorization
from Congress, which would reflect the importance of and continuing
need for this monitoring agency. Moreover, actual or perceived
manipulation of rules designed to ensure true diversity among the
Commissioners should lead to an exploration of an alternative
appointments process that will yield a genuinely diverse set of
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Commissioners and thus enhanced credibility for its vitally significant
work.
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CLOSING STATEMENT
The Possibilities of More to Overcome the Limitations of Less
Lisa Crooms
As Professor Sidhu notes, there are a number of points on which
we agree. To those points, I would add the following:
First, Father Hesburgh’s initial call to expand the Commission’s
work according to a human rights mandate was accompanied by
optimism about how quickly civil rights laws would change the terrain
of race and rights in the United States that time has shown was
unwarranted. Second, the racial justice at the center of the
Commission’s mandate has not been achieved. Third, more than one
president rejected Father Hesburgh’s idea to expand the
Commission’s mandate to include human rights. Fourth, human
rights address the general wellbeing of society regarding matters such
as poverty, nutrition, welfare, and education. Fifth, in post-9/11
America, human rights include those issues raised by the “War on
Terror” that relate to U.S. human rights treaty obligations. Sixth,
many of the issues that might benefit from being considered through
a human rights lens are part of the Commission’s existing mandate.
Seventh, many of the Commission’s problems stem from not the
scope of its jurisdiction, but rather from how this jurisdiction is either
exercised or understood. Eighth, there is both value in and a need
for an independent national entity to monitor and assess U.S.
compliance with human rights law.
Finally, more money,
congressional reauthorization, a different appointments process, and
genuinely diverse membership would enhance the Commission’s work
and credibility.
Our common ground, however, forms a backdrop that brings our
points of disagreement into sharp relief. Whereas Professor Sidhu
sees the Commission as the poster child for the movement for simple
living, I share Father Hesburgh’s belief in the possibility of more
rather than less. Enlarging “the vision of the American dream beyond
the purely political rights in national documents of Government . . .
[to] take in the broader view of the totality of human rights” remains
the basis on which the government should expand the Commission’s
mandate. Hesburgh, supra, at 303-04 (quoting Hearings, supra, at 272).
Much has changed since Father Hesburgh first linked the
Commission and human rights—chiefly, the United States has ratified
human rights treaties that require our government to respect rights
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such as equality and nondiscrimination and to protect and promote
these rights domestically. Just as human rights is the broader context
in which American civil rights exist, adding human rights treaties to
the Commission’s jurisdiction merely formalizes the role the
Commission is expected to play in monitoring domestic laws
implementing human rights and efforts to enforce them.
As if anticipating Professor Sidhu’s protestations, Father
Hesburgh observed that “[s]ome people would object to this and say,
look, you have enough problems, you should not take on any more,
but I think, perhaps, sometimes, when you are having trouble getting
a limited job done, you can even take on a larger job with a larger
vision.” Id. at 304 (quoting Hearings, supra, at 273). Father
Hesburgh’s vision finds additional support in the fact that an
understanding of the domestic aspects of human rights law, as well as
the primacy of enforcement and implementation at the national,
rather than international level, has become de rigueur. The Obama
Administration recognizes that upholding human rights requires
countries to assess their own domestic laws, policies, and practices.
The Administration characterizes the United States as “seek[ing] to
advance human rights and fundamental freedoms around the world,
[and doing] so cognizant of [its] own commitment to live up to [its]
ideals at home and to meet [its] international human rights
obligations.” U.S. Human Rights Commitments and Pledges, U.S. BUREAU
OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS (Apr. 27, 2009)
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/122476.pdf.
That such a shift of domestic focus on addressing human rights
seems unwieldy is largely a function of the noninterventionism and
exceptionalism that have predominated U.S. engagement with the
international community. For the United States, participating in the
United Nations as well as acceding to the principles rooted in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), has always been a
mixed bag. More often than not, the United States dickers over treaty
language and denounces the human rights violations of others while
neither abiding by the treaty language it helped draft nor permitting
universal standards to be used to assess its human rights record. For
example, the United States helped draft the UDHR which declares
“[a]ll human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights[,]”
but at the same time, the government remained committed to the
idea that de jure racial segregation was off limits for the emerging
human rights regime. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A.
Res. 217 (III) A, at art. I, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III)(Dec. 10, 1948).
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This is the same dissonance the United States exhibited in its desire to
“form a more perfect union” so strong that it yielded a constitutional
compromise that simultaneously advanced notions of liberty and due
process of law while protecting property interests and the institution
of chattel slavery.
Only a civil war and three constitutional
amendments would begin to address the gaps between the
Constitution’s soaring rhetoric and the country’s “peculiar
institution.” Within fifteen years of the ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment, Congress’s authority to enforce its provisions—including
equal protection of the laws—was limited based on the belief that
Federal civil rights laws had permitted former slaves to “shake[ ] off
the inseparable concomitants of that state.” Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S.
3, 25 (1883). This permitted the former slave to reach a “stage in the
progress of his elevation when he takes the rank of a mere citizen, and
ceases to be the special favorite of the laws, and when his rights as a
citizen . . . are to be protected in the ordinary modes by which other
men’s rights are protected.” Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 61.
Thirteen years later, “equal protection of the laws” and “separate but
equal” became synonymous. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 548
(1896).
Having placed the government’s imprimatur on legally
mandated racism, states were free to enact legislation designed to keep
the races separate in the name of protecting the health, safety, and
welfare of their citizens. This would remain the case until 1954, when the
Supreme Court declared that the doctrine of separate but equal was
unconstitutional. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
This change would not have occurred without a multilevel assault
on Jim Crow that was fueled in part by the notion of human rights as
expressed in the United Nation’s Declaration of Human Rights.
Contemporary appeals to embrace human rights are directly linked to
the history of advocacy of those who saw the United Nations as a
forum in which the United States might be held to account for the
“lynching, brutality, terror, humiliation, and degradation through
segregation and discrimination” that marked the reign of Jim Crow.
Roy Wilkins, Editorial, Now is not the Time to Be Silent, THE CRISIS, Jan.
1942, reprinted in THE CRISIS, Nov. 1970, at 331. By directly petitioning
the United Nations, these civil rights advocates “captured the
imagination of African Americans by lifting the struggle of the Negro
out of the local and national setting and placing it in the realm of the
international.” CAROL ANDERSON, EYES OFF THE PRIZE 93 (2003)
(internal quotation marks omitted). It should be no surprise that
these petitions were defeated by the maneuverings of U.S.
representatives determined to keep “the Negro question” out of the
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United Nations. Nascent Cold War politics further distorted domestic
views of human rights, inextricably linking them to a looming
Communist threat. Many human rights advocates found themselves
summoned by the House Committee on Un-American Affairs,
stripped of their passports and branded as enemies. This context
conspired to create a lexicon in which human rights were foreign and
fundamentally un-American, obscuring the essential Americanness of
contemporary human rights and the struggle for dignity and equality
at the root of the United Nation’s human rights mandate.
Thankfully, the American imprint on human rights law is not lost
on the current Administration. By rhetorically breaking with the past,
President Obama has eschewed exceptionalism, opting to lead by an
example based on principled engagement.
To this end, his
administration is committed “to meeting its UN treaty obligations and
participating in a meaningful dialogue with treaty body members.”
U.S. Human Rights Commitments and Pledges, supra. It is also committed
to cooperate “with the UN’s human rights mechanisms . . . by
responding to inquiries, engaging in dialogues, and hosting visits.” Id.
These commitments evince an understanding of human rights as
relevant to both domestic and foreign policy. It is this domestic
human rights law and policy that would be central to the
Commission’s work.
The current Administration also understands that racial justice
and equality are essential parts of U.S. human rights obligations. The
United States has noted its strong commitment “to fighting racism
and discrimination, and acts of violence committed because of racial
or ethnic hatred.” Id. It has acknowledged that “racism still exists in
our country and we continue to fight it.” Id. These commitments
demonstrate that adopting a human rights framework need not sound
the death knell for the continuing struggle against racial injustice.
Rather, the seemingly intractable questions of race and rights as
matters of domestic law and policy—by virtue of the United States’s
ratification of treaties such as the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights and the International Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Racism—involve human rights. This challenges
Professor Sidhu’s claim that although “civil rights and international
human rights laws may be linked at the most general level by concerns
for human dignity, both are of a distinct nature, are enforced by
completely different statutes, regulations, and treaties, and implicate
wholly different sets of parties.” Rebuttal, supra. The distinction
between positive practices based on noninterventionism and
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exceptionalism, on the one hand, and normative efforts of principled
engagement informed by the fundamental idea that human rights are
both universal and interdependent, on the other hand, is challenged
to clarify the requirement that the standards and norms contained in
ratified human rights treaties become imbedded in domestic law and
policy. Implementation and enforcement of international human
rights norms will require the United States to pass laws that
incorporate these standards into domestic law. The stakeholders
involved in implementing and enforcing human rights domestically
are the same stakeholders involved in promulgating and enforcing
civil rights laws, as well as monitoring those efforts. This would be the
human rights work of Father Hesburgh’s U.S. Commission on Civil
Rights and Human Rights. The Commission’s current responsibility
to monitor fifty states and the District of Columbia further supports
expanding its mandate. Indeed, the conditions under which the
United States ratifies human rights treaties make both the executing
laws and the nuts-and-bolts enforcement and implementation of these
laws at the state and local level matters with which the Commission
would continue to be concerned, particularly as they relate to racial
justice and equality. As the Obama Administration’s human rights
commitments make clear, the voting rights which Professor Sidhu
correctly identifies as an essential part of “[t]he factual predicate for
the Commission’s existence” are also an essential part of the U.S.
record on human rights. Id.
To situate civil rights within human rights is among the first steps
needed to make good on the Obama Administration’s human rights
pledges. To expand the Commission’s mandate is essential to
building the kind of domestic human rights infrastructure needed to
meet U.S. treaty-based obligations. In this type of infrastructure,
human rights and fundamental freedoms include not only the civil
and political rights that have been the mainstay of U.S. civil rights
laws, but also the economic, social, and cultural rights that are far too
often either left to the vagaries of the market or seen as a matter of
individual choice and responsibility. Like Father Hesburgh, I
advocate for this expansion based on a belief in the possibilities of the
more of human rights rather than the less of civil rights. To this end,
I return to Father Hesburgh’s observations about these possibilities.
As he noted, “[t]o a large extent, our recommendations represent
ideas whose times have not yet come. . . . A principal purpose of
making what some believe are politically unrealistic recommendations
is to bring these recommendations into the arena of public dialogue,
with the conviction that this will hasten the time for adoption.”
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Hesburgh, supra, at 300. It is in this spirit that I embrace Father
Hesburgh’s idea about expanding the Commission’s mandate to
include human rights with the firm belief that it is an idea whose time
has finally come.
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CLOSING STATEMENT
All Along the Watchtower
Dawinder S. Sidhu
The proposal to expand the mandate of the U.S. Commission on
Civil Rights to include monitoring of the nation’s compliance with
international human rights has been the subject of this Debate. In my
Closing Statement, I intend to explain directly and through analogy
why this proposal remains unpersuasive. Specifically and at the most
basic level, it seems to me that advocates of this proposal have failed to
prove at least four points that appear to be central to their position:
first, that the state of civil rights is so favorable or tractable as to allow
the Commission to assume a significantly widened jurisdiction over
issues outside of the traditional civil rights arena; second, that an
enlarged mandate will not diminish the Commission’s existing
capabilities to study civil rights in America; third, that monitoring
compliance with international human rights obligations is a
responsibility that must be bestowed on the Commission as opposed to
another independent federal body; and fourth, that objections to the
proposal are grounded only in certain rigid ideologies or political
theories that do not, as an original or threshold matter, believe in the
importance of American compliance with international human rights
standards or norms.
I. PRELIMINARY COMMENT
Before addressing the residual contentions about the merits of the
proposal, I am compelled to respond to Professor Crooms’s view,
expressed in her final salvo, that I “see[] the Commission as the poster
child for the movement for simple living.” This characterization lacks
any relationship to the truth. The Commission, as I attempted to
articulate in my Rebuttal, is charged with performing a vitally
significant public function: to ensure that our nation is effectively
eliminating the specter of discrimination such that an ordered,
prosperous society comprised of different people may be a viable
possibility instead of an unattainable, Platonic ideal. The extent to
which our nation protects the civil rights of the people is the extent to
which our nation has fulfilled its promise of liberty for all, and to
which the people are truly free to pursue opportunities that may lead
to a better life for themselves, their families, and society at large.
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Conversely, the nation will not and “cannot endure if [it] falls short
on the guarantees of liberty, justice, and equality embodied in our
founding documents.” Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 348 (1970)
(Brennan, J., concurring). Quite plainly, civil rights are fundamental
and foundational in American society.
Post-9/11 realities help underscore the importance of civil rights.
In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, Muslims and
those perceived to be Muslim have been harassed, assaulted, refused
service in places of public accommodation, fired by their employers,
and ejected from airplanes, among other things—not because of any
tie to terrorism, but because of their appearance, which superficially
links them to those who “look” like terrorists. See generally DAWINDER
S. SIDHU & NEHA SINGH GOHIL, CIVIL RIGHTS IN WARTIME: THE POST9/11 SIKH EXPERIENCE (2009); Muneer I. Ahmad, A Rage Shared by
Law: Post-September 11 Racial Violence as Crimes of Passion, 92 CAL. L.
REV. 1259, 1259-63 (2004). Many Muslims and Sikhs were forced to
stay indoors out of concern for their physical safety, mask their
religious identity in order to seem less dangerous or suspicious to
others, broadcast their allegiance to the United States by displaying
American flags in their cars and outside of their homes, and question
whether they truly belonged in this American experiment in religious
freedom. See, e.g., SIKH COALITION, HATRED IN THE HALLWAYS: A
PRELIMINARY REPORT ON BIAS AGAINST SIKH STUDENTS IN NEW YORK
CITY’S
PUBLIC
SCHOOLS
5
(2007),
available
at
http://www.sikhcoalition.org/
advisories/documents/HatredintheHallwaysFinal.pdf (recounting a
Sikh student’s decision to cut his hair to avoid further harassment);
Image Archives: Cover Image from Nov. 5, 2001, THE NEW YORKER,
http://images.archives.newyorker.com/djvu/Conde%20Nast/New%2
0Yorker/2001_11_05/webimages/page0000001_1.jpg (last visited
Dec. 15, 2010); Sam McManis, Protective Coloring of Patriotism: U.S. Flag
Serves as Armor Against Bigotry, SFGATE.COM (Oct. 06, 2001),
http://articles.sfgate.com/2001-10-06/news/17623036_1_americanflag-central-valley-sikh; Kenji Yoshino, Uncovering Muslim Identity,
TOWARD FREEDOM (Nov. 23, 2005), http://www.towardfreedom.com/
home/content/view/674/54.
As a member of the Sikh community, I assure the reader
(although I hope it may already be clear) that the civil rights matters
with which the Commission deals are not about ensuring a “simple
living” or cushy lifestyle. Rather, the Commission’s practical objective
is to make it less likely that targeted groups will be threatened,
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harassed, intimidated, assaulted, or subject to other illegal, hate-based
conduct as they go about their daily lives.
The civil rights of post-9/11 Muslims and Sikhs (and others who
have been the subject of discrimination) fall squarely within the
Commission’s existing mandate and are precisely what the
Commission should be trying to safeguard through its monitoring and
advisory duties. The Commission is not a “poster child” or mere
window-dressing, but is in some respects one of the few bastions of
hope and relief for those facing persistent discrimination—especially
for those without the political wherewithal or know-how to effect
change through other means.
II. LESS IS MORE
Professor Crooms believes in the “possibility of more rather than
less” for the Commission. Crooms, Closing Statement, supra. One may
be more inclined to agree with Professor Crooms if—and only if—the
existing mandate of the Commission were not so rife with systemic
and ongoing societal problems stemming from voting and
discrimination in other contexts.
The post-9/11 difficulties
encountered by Muslims and Sikhs—which continue to linger over
nine years after the attacks—are but one example of the broad,
national civil rights problems that require the dedicated attention and
interest of the Commission. Others include, but are not limited to,
racial disparities in access to the criminal justice system, racial
discrimination and disenfranchisement, the equality of educational and
life opportunities for individuals with emerging disabilities such as posttraumatic stress disorder, and the rights of immigrants outside of the
formal legal process. These examples are just the tip of the iceberg.
Even if the universe of national civil rights problems were limited
to the problems just mentioned, the Commission would have its hands
full: significant resources and time would be needed to properly
examine the particular civil rights issues across the nation within these
broad
subjects,
and
to
then
propose
comprehensive
recommendations for their remediation.
The fact remains, however, that the Commission has been unable
to sufficiently deal with these already weighty national civil rights
matters. Were it otherwise, traditional civil rights issues would be
disappearing from our public squares, boardrooms, and schools. The
persistence of these problems suggests that the Commission’s work is
still necessary and that to dilute its substantive responsibilities would
be to diminish its abilities relative to traditional civil rights and give
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license to some of the very issues we wish to banish from our society.
The operative question, therefore, is not whether to expand the
fact-finding and advisory functions of the Commission, but how to
better ensure that the Commission does its existing job more
effectively for the benefit of the people, including Muslims with
headscarves, embattled soldiers returning home, or minorities without
access to counsel or a fair trial, sitting for years on death row.
In this respect, Father Hesburgh advances a powerful and
compelling argument. He posits, in essence, that civil rights are
human rights and that as a result, any given individual should be
concerned about the Muslim, the soldier, or the prisoner because her
rights are my rights. See generally Thomas Paine, DISSERTATION ON FIRST
PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT (1795), reprinted in 2 THE POLITICAL AND
MISCELLANEOUS WORKS OF THOMAS PAINE 17 (R. Carlile ed.) (1819)
(“[E]very man must finally see the necessity of protecting the rights of
others as the most effectual security for his own.”). If, by contrast, we
see civil rights as particular to a given group and of relevance only if
the group to which we belong is implicated, civil rights in this nation
will continue to languish and suffer from indifference, apathy, or
“silence,” as Father Hesburgh poignantly observed. Hesburgh, supra
at 302. Father Hesburgh’s alternative—that civil rights be reframed as
human rights—warrants greater exposure and promotion.
If
anything, this Debate between Professor Crooms and me may be
considered successful because we both see the value of and need for
civil rights to be construed as universally held rights. For the
Commission’s focus to remain on traditional civil rights and for those
rights to be reframed as human rights may offer a clearer lens
through which civil rights may be viewed and may thus trigger a new,
more effective era of civil rights monitoring and resulting compliance.
III. THE FOLLY OF MORE
If we consider the Commission’s existing jurisdiction—
discrimination and fraud in voting, discrimination generally, and the
denial of equal protection—as a certain area of law, it is the
Commission’s duty to monitor and examine societal problems and
governmental responses in this area. The Commission is akin to a
guard at a watchtower, overseeing the social activity and government
actions in a particular part of the sea. As is evident by even a cursory
assessment of the country, and as shown by the examples discussed
herein, this area contains many entrenched, difficult, and complex
issues requiring the watchful eye of our conscientious guard.
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Professor Crooms and others would load additional supervisory
duties onto this guard, asking her to review the state not only of this
area (voting disparities and fraud, discrimination, and equal
protection), but of another vast and complicated area as well—the
nation’s compliance with international human rights obligations.
While these areas may blend together at the margins, there can be no
doubt that they are in fact separate and separable. In addition to
monitoring traditional civil rights issues falling within its existing
jurisdiction, such as discrimination against Muslims, individuals with
disabilities, or minorities in the criminal justice system, our guard
would be responsible for assessing, for example, whether
waterboarding constitutes torture, whether detainees in Abu Ghraib
or Bagram have been mistreated, whether detainees outside of
Guantánamo are entitled to the writ of habeas corpus, and whether
any current or former government officials (such as George W. Bush,
John Ashcroft, Robert Mueller, and John Yoo) may be held liable for
their involvement in approving or preparing wartime policies and
tactics. Accordingly, placing international human rights compliance
on the Commission’s shoulders does not, as Professor Crooms claims,
“merely formalize” an expectation that the Commission look into
human rights, but instead adds completely different substantive
responsibilities to the Commission’s demanding and pressing docket.
In addition to international human rights compliance, Professor
Crooms would seemingly have the Commission monitor the general
well-being of everyone in America:
[H]uman rights and fundamental freedoms include not only the civil
and political rights which have been the mainstay of U.S. civil rights laws,
but also the economic, social and cultural rights that are far too often
either left to the vagaries of the market or seen as a matter of individual
choice and responsibility.

For the Commission to examine overall social welfare—such as
poverty, nutrition, welfare, and related issues—would be for the
Commission to explore virtually the entire universe of social problems
and governmental action. One struggles to find an aspect of
American life that could not be reasonably tied to economic, social,
and cultural rights and thus would lie outside the Commission’s
jurisdiction. One guard cannot be expected to oversee or survey all,
as the advocates of the proposal appear to suggest.
IV. AN ALTERNATIVE
The expansive, if not unlimited, jurisdiction proposed by
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Professor Crooms begs the following question: why must the
Commission bear the sole responsibility for monitoring individual
rights issues?
Professor Crooms cites as “support” for the
Commission’s expanded role Father Hesburgh’s statement that
“sometimes, when you are having trouble getting a limited job done,
you can even take on a larger job with a larger vision.” Hesburgh,
supra, at 303-04 (quoting Hearings, supra, at 273). With due respect to
Father Hesburgh, this statement amounts to a comment of purely
aspirational qualities rather than an argument with an evidentiary
basis. Professor Crooms further notes that “an understanding of the
domestic aspects of human rights law, as well as the primacy of
enforcement and implementation at the national, rather than
international level, has become de rigueur.” At the outset of my
Rebuttal, I endorsed fully the idea that “a federal entity independent
of the tripartite branches of the federal government should study and
assess whether the United States upholds its commitments to
voluntarily assumed international human rights laws.” It does not
follow from an appreciation for the relationship between civil rights
and human rights, or from a recognition that nations themselves
rather than super-national bodies should engage in enforcement of
these rights, or from an agreement that human rights proper should
be examined by an independent federal body, that monitoring the
nation’s human rights record must fall to the Commission.
In my Rebuttal, I suggested an alternative paradigm in which
compliance efforts would be shared. Specifically, I wrote that the
international human rights questions might go to “a new,
independent federal entity specifically and exclusively established to
monitor America’s compliance with its international human rights
obligations.” I proposed a second guard on the watchtower, if you will.
Professor Crooms’s Closing Statement completely ignores this
idea and instead appears to insist that the only option with respect to
international human rights monitoring is to augment the mandate of
the Commission. This seemingly all-or-nothing approach lacks
practical sense and may even be harmful; it compels our guard to take
on the whole landscape of individual-rights-monitoring and makes it
more likely that some matters may be overlooked or ignored out of
sheer administrative strain.
To obviate the possibility that such monitoring may be stretched
too thin, we may take a cue from federal agencies that divvy up
compliance responsibilities among several agencies. The rights of
individuals with disabilities, for example, are distributed among
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several agencies, including the Departments of Justice, Education, and
Housing and Urban Development. Even with respect to rights that
are directly related and not just linked at abstract levels, splitting the
load makes eminent sense. That these duties are diffused does not
indicate that they are any less related or important, or less worthy of
public or government attention. Rather, this allocation honors their
nuanced nature and enhances the agencies’ collective ability to
address and redress certain individual rights. By the same token, the
Commission need and should not be the sole independent entity that
works to ensure that the nation is meeting its obligations with respect
to civil rights and human rights proper. Advocates of the proposal to
expand the Commission’s mandate appear to be unwilling or unable
to recognize the merits of the federal agency model.
Indeed, responsibility is shared not only among the agencies that
directly promulgate laws and policies with respect to civil rights, but
among multiple independent federal bodies charged with monitoring
and recommending solutions to individual rights issues. For example,
the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom examines
whether individuals worldwide may practice their faith free of
persecution. International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, Pub. L.
No. 105-292, 112 Stat. 2787 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 22 U.S.C.). The now-defunct U.S. Commission on Immigration
Reform studied, among other things, improving family reunification
efforts, curbing illegal immigration, the impact of immigration on the
labor market, the provision of educational opportunities to
immigrants, and national security. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L.
No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978. Clearly, it is possible for multiple
independent guards to stand watch over the sea of individual rights,
even if there may be an overlap of jurisdiction.
The presumption that the Commission is to assume all human
rights monitoring duties—not just those that may be said to be part of
its existing mandate—is difficult to square with the sensible and
prudent sharing of monitoring functions that the federal government
has practiced. Put differently, a fixation on a unified procedural
framework invariably will point to a catchall Commission with broad
civil rights and human rights monitoring duties, however a focus on
how to optimally address the rights of the people dictates a more
workable, shared system.
CONCLUSION
My argument is not meant to deny the importance of monitoring
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our human rights obligations.
In fact, such adherence to
international human rights laws not only reaffirms our belief in the
rule of law, but can also generate greater American credibility and
legitimacy in the world, particularly the Muslim world. In other
words, faithfulness to voluntarily assumed human rights standards can
be an important and positive instrument of foreign policy. NYE, supra
at 55. It cannot be said, therefore, that objections to the proposal to
expand the Commission’s mandate are grounded in American
exceptionalism or isolationism. Proponents of the proposal must
convince their kin—people in their own tent of political theory and
those who also seek American fidelity to its human rights
commitments—of the merits of an expanded Commission. They
cannot simply assume that those with objections are on the opposite
end of the ideological spectrum and reflexively discount these
objections as a result.
Ultimately, the question boils down to how, not whether, the
nation’s compliance with its international human rights obligations
should be monitored. I regret that advocates of the proposal now
under consideration have failed to carry their burden of showing that
the Commission—tasked already with weighty and complex civil rights
monitoring responsibilities in a nation that remains racially charged,
in which there exists great social distance between people of different
groups, and in which the “us” versus “them” mentality stubbornly
persists—is the best or only home for human rights monitoring, as well.
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